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1 Introduction
What determines the variation in stated preferences for environmental goods? Researchers
have investigated the effects on willingness to pay (WTP) of observables such as income
(Jacobsen and Hanley 2009), experience with and knowledge of the good (LaRiviere et al.
2014; Czajkowski et al. 2015), and location (Schaafsma et al. 2013; Termansen et al. 2013);
as well as exploring ways of modelling un-observed heterogeneity (Hynes et al. 2008). In
this paper, we explore the possible impacts of another set of factors on the variation in stated
preferences, namely an individual’s emotional state at the time of the survey.
A large literature in behavioural sciences and psychology suggests that emotions affect
people’s decisions in a wide range of settings (Loewenstein 2000; Elster 1998). This evi-
dence, whichwe summarize in Sect. 2 of this paper, is largely obtained in the context of actual
choices and behaviours. It might therefore be reasonable to speculate that emotions will also
affect stated choices. However, behavioural intention is not identical to actual behaviour. For
example, the theory of planned behaviour (see e.g., Ajzen 1991) suggests that a behaviour
is influenced primarily by the intention to achieve the behaviour and the degree of perceived
(and actual) control over the behaviour. Although the theory of planned behaviour has been
shown to account for substantial amounts of variance in intention and behaviour (Armitage
and Conner 2001), the relationship can depend upon intermediated factors such as individual
attitudes to the behaviour in question and social norms about the behaviour (Ajzen 1991).
Thus, whilst emotions have been shown to affect actual behaviour, they might not neces-
sarily affect stated choices in the same way, if for example emotions influence intentions
or perceptions about control (Ruthig et al. 2007). Nevertheless, it would be expected that if
emotions were to influence intentions or control perceptions, they may still play an important
role, albeit a slightly different one to that of actual behaviour, in stated choices. It is this role
which this paper investigates.
If there are effects of changing emotions on revealed or stated choices, this could pose
a challenge to the interpretation of benefit-cost measures of value, since these are based
on a model of rational choice and stable, consistent, and complete preference sets for each
individual (Brown et al. 2008; Rabin 1998). If revealed or stated values are dependent upon
an individual’s emotional state at the time benefits or costs are measured, then this introduces
a source of context dependence which the Kaldor–Hicks criterion underlying Cost-Benefit
Analysis (CBA)was not intended to deal with.1 For example, a change in emotional state post
project implementation couldmean that thosewho gain are no longerwilling to pay enough to
compensate losers, even though the project had passed the CBA test before implementation.
In this paper, we focus on a specific class of emotions referred to as incidental emotions.
These emotions, such as sadness or happiness, occur at the moment of a choice decision, but
are un-related to the payoffs from the decision at hand. Our experimental set-up uses stated
choice modelling to estimate preferences over changes in an environmental good in an exper-
imental laboratory setting, with a series of treatments designed to induce a given emotional
state in respondents prior to their stated choices. The emotional states are sadness, happiness
and a neutral state. We induce these different incidental emotions using an established prac-
tice in behavioural science. We subsequently test whether the inducement procedure worked
in terms of inducing the targeted emotional state, and find that it did. The materials used to
induce the targeted emotional state are un-related to the environmental good, since otherwise
1 Tests for whether a project or policy will improve social well-being were proposed independently by Kaldor
and by Hicks in the 1930s, but are now usually combined together in what is also known as the “potential
pareto improvement” criterion. See Hanley and Barbier (2009) for more detail.
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participants would feel they were being manipulated in terms of stating their choices for
changes in the good (beach quality).
Our main hypothesis is that variation in emotional state experienced prior to participation
in the stated choice experiment has a significant effect on stated preferences (and thus on
Willingness To Pay) for changes in an environmental good. That is, we test whether variations
in emotional state can help explain preference heterogeneity. Based on inferences one can
draw from the psychology literature, we also test whether a respondent’s emotional state
impacts on the randomness with which they make their choices in the stated preference
exercise.
2 Emotional Effects on Choice and Behaviour
Emotions are thought to enter into the decision making process in three important ways (Rick
and Loewenstein 2008). First, certain emotions may be anticipated directly from the outcome
of the decision itself andmaterialize at some future point i.e. through comparing the expected
happiness from purchasing a new book compared with going to a football game. Second,
there are emotions, referred to as integral emotions, which occur at the moment of decision
and are directly related to the decision at hand (Lerner et al. 2014). For example, the decision
itself may pose some element of risk and therefore evoke feelings of fear, or even pleasure
(Loewenstein et al. 2001). As Rick and Loewenstein (2008) argue, neither of these types of
emotions pose a major challenge for the rational choice framework of welfare economics
and mainstream economic consumer theory, since they influence the utility associated with
choice alternatives, and therefore should affect people’s choices.
The third way in which emotions can influence behaviour is through a consideration of
“incidental emotions”, emotions which occur at the moment of the decision but are irrelevant
to its payoffs. Incidental emotions, such as anger, fear, surprise, disgust, joy, or sadness, may
be present whilst individuals are making important decisions for many different reasons. For
example, an individual may be sad from thinking about an argument they had that morning,
or from a recent bereavement, or they might be happy from having just watched an uplifting
film, or just from the fact that it happens to be a sunny day. Incidental emotions are known to
influence high level cognitive processes, such as interpretation, judgement, decision-making,
and reasoning (Blanchette and Richards 2010) and it has thus been suggested that incidental
emotions have the power to “reprogram us into effectively different people” (Loewenstein
2010).On the basis that sunshine causes greater feelings of happiness (e.g., Schwarz andClore
1983) the amount of sunshine in a given day has, for example, been shown to influence stock
market performance (Hirshleifer and Shumway 2003; Kamstra et al. 2003). Further, when
a country’s team is eliminated from the World Cup, stock market returns decline (Edmans
et al. 2007). The psychological evidence thus suggests a strong likelihood that incidental
emotions will influence an individual’s stated preferences for environmental goods, even
though they do not affect the payoffs from choice alternatives. If this was the case there may
be a fundamental threat to conventional economic models. However, this proposition has yet
to be tested.
A substantial amount of this research highlighting the importance of incidental emotions
has come from experiments where researchers induce specific emotions within an individual
prior to them carrying out some decision-based task (Lerner et al. 2014). Before the task,
researchers randomize individuals into an “emotion manipulation”, whereby a procedure
such as watching film clips, reading stories, or listening to music, is used to elicit specific
emotions (Gilet 2008; Westermann et al. 1996). Johnson and Tversky (1983) provided one
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of the first empirical demonstrations that inducing a specific emotional state, via reading
newspaper stories, resulted in different risk perceptions. Since then, notable findings include
that the endowment effect was eliminated when inducing disgust and completely reversed
when inducing sadness (Lerner et al. 2004). Andrade and Ariely (2009) demonstrate, using
ultimatum and dictator games, that the emotions induced via showing a film can endure by
not only influencing decisions in the moment but also by influencing subsequent decisions.
It has also been shown that when a charity appeal invokes feelings of sympathy, guilt or
personal nostalgia, then donations increase (see e.g., Kogut and Ritov (2005); Small and
Loewenstein (2003); Ford andMerchant (2010)). Current sexual arousal has also been shown
to influence behavioural decisions relating to sex (Ariely and Loewenstein 2005) and when
inducedwith happiness individuals have higher productivity in a paid piece-rate task (Oswald
et al. forthcoming). Indeed, there is relatively scant evidence where affective states have not
influenced decision-making in some way (Blanchette and Richards 2010).
Based around the mechanisms driving such differences in decisions, positive and negative
emotions have been shown to lead to very different ways of processing information. We
may expect individuals in a “happy” state to have a higher desire to avoid losses (in our
experiment, losses correspond todeclines in environmental quality at beaches);whilst being in
a happy state generally increases the reliance on heuristic processing and decreases systematic
possessing (Blanchette and Richards 2010). Isen et al. (1988) show, for example, that those
induced with happiness show a more negative subjective utility for losses than those not
induced. As such it is possible that those induced to feel happiness will make relatively quick
decisions, be more sensitive to losses, and therefore have a different WTP for changes in
environmental quality than those who are not induced to feel happy. Due to greater reliance
on heuristics, we also expect happy individuals to make more mistakes i.e. demonstrate more
randomness in their choices. Contrastingly, sadness induces more careful and systematic
processing over decisions (Bodenhausen et al. 2000). Individuals induced to feel sadness
would take more time in making their decisions, make fewer mistakes, and thus exhibit less
randomness in their decisions relative to those who are not sad. Further, sad individuals are
less reliant on stereotypes and spend more time processing case information (e.g., Bless et al.
1996a, b) suggesting they may be more considerate towards the interests of others (and thus
differ in their preferences for public goods which benefit others).
Summing up, an extensive literature in behavioural science and psychology suggests that
changes in incidental emotions can alter how people make choices and how they behave. It
is thus possible to set out four alternative hypotheses for testing. These are:
Preference heterogeneity effect
H10 : individuals in a sad or a happy (i.e., non-neutral) emotional state will state different
preferences for changes in an environmental good than those in a neutral emotional state.
H20 : individuals who are in a happy emotional state will state different preferences for
changes in an environmental good than those in a sad emotional state.
Randomness of choice effect
H30 : individuals in a sad or happy (i.e., non-neutral) state will display a different random-
ness of stated choices than individuals in a neutral state.
H40 : individuals in a happy emotional state will display a different randomness of stated
choices than individuals in a sad emotional state.
We now describe an experiment where these hypotheses are tested.
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3 Experimental Design
3.1 Lab Procedures
The experiment consisted of 17 sessions conducted in September 2014 at theWaikato Exper-
imental Economics Laboratory at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. A total of 287
subjects participated in the experiment. The participants were university students that were
recruited university wide using ORSEE (Greiner 2004).2 Some of the participants had par-
ticipated in previous economics experiments, but none had experience with the emotion
elicitation methods employed. All interaction within the experiment took place via private
computer terminals. Each session lasted for less than one hour. The time subjects took to
complete the survey varied widely, but each session lasted until the last person had completed
their tasks and all had then been paid. Participants were paid NZD 20 upon completion of
the survey.
We randomized participants into one of three different conditions: a sadness condition,
a happiness condition, and a neutral condition. This was done as soon as respondents had
entered the lab, and before they were presented with the stated choice experiment. In each
treatment, participants were asked to watch a collection of short film clips (approximately 6–
7 minutes in length). The short film clips in each collection had the same valence. “Valence”
in psychology refers to the extent to which a particular event or object evokes an attractive
(positive valence) or aversive (negative valence) response. Thus those in the sadness condition
were showna collection of films that evoked emotions of sadness i.e. a negative valence,whilst
those in the happiness condition were shown a collection of films that evoked emotions of
happiness i.e. a positive valence. Those in the neutral condition were shown a collection of
films that were neither aversive nor attractive and therefore would be considered to have a
neutral valence. The film clips were selected based on prior research which has illustrated
the effectiveness of such clips in eliciting specific emotions (Rottenberg et al. 2007; Schaefer
et al. 2010). Feinstein et al. (2010) demonstrate that such films have a persistent impact
on emotional state, even for patients with amnesia. It has been shown that showing a short
film with emotional content before a task is the most effective way to induce a specific
emotion (Gilet 2008). Specific clips from well-known films have been used to induce fear
(TheShining:Boven et al. 2012), anger (CryFreedom: Inbar andGilovich 2011), or happiness
(various comedy clips: Forgas and East 2008). Such a technique has been well validated with
several attempts to systematically review the effectiveness of different film clips, as well as
categorize the precise emotions they elicit (see e.g., Schaefer et al. 2010).
In our survey, we used clips adapted from Feinstein et al. (2010) to elicit two incidental
emotions, sadness and happiness, prior to decisions relating to the environment. Typically,
studies include neutral conditions which involve showing documentaries relating specifically
to nature (e.g., Andrade and Ariely 2009; Forgas and East 2008). To avoid priming subjects
with concerns about the environment (given that this was the object over which people were
then being asked to make choices), we ensured our neutral condition consisted instead of
various non-emotional clips unrelated to the environment. The specific film clips used for
each condition are listed in Table 1.
At the end of the choice experiment we carried out a manipulation check and asked
participants to report how they felt while they were watching the video clips. We asked two
2 The Online Recruitment System for Economics Experiments (ORSEE) is a subject recruitment and man-
agement program specifically designed for economics experiments. More information can be found at http://
www.orsee.org/web/.
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Table 1 Film clips used in each of the experimental conditions. Resources available at http://tinyurl.com/
hnr3jnt
Experimental
condition
Clip 1 Clip 2 Clip 3 Clip 4 Total time
Sadness (negative
valence)
The Champ (Child
experiences his
hero’s
death—2:42)
Born on the 4th of
July (Man
injured from war
has returned
home and is
distraught—
1:59)
Forest Gump
(Man is at the
graveside of his
love—2:01)
6:42
Happiness
(positive
valence)
Ladder 49 (Man
finds out his
wife is
pregnant—1:18)
Love actually
(Man proposes
to a
woman—2:21)
Love Actually
(People meeting
loved ones at the
airport—1:19)
Indiana Jones
(Children return
home to their
parents—1:16)
6:14
Neutral Stock market
report (Woman
reports on the
stock
market—1:30)
Golf grip video
(Man describes
how to grip a
golf club—1:51)
Abstract painting
(Woman
describes acrylic
painting
techniques—
1:06)
Antiques auctions
(Man describes
items sold at an
antiques
auction—1:26)
5:53
questions relating to valence (the intrinsic attractiveness: positive or negative): “While I was
watching the film I felt. . .1 = sad (bad), 4 = neither happy nor sad (neither bad nor good),
7 = happy (good)”.
3.2 The Choice Experiment
We designed a choice experiment (Hensher et al. 2005) to elicit preferences for an envi-
ronmental good, namely visits to the beach on the North Island of New Zealand. Choice
experiments describe the objects of choice (here, beach visits) using the attributes of these
objects, and the levels which they can take. Beach visits within the North Island of New
Zealand were described using a set of three attributes, based on discussions with scientists
from the National Institute for Water and Atmosphere. The three environmental attributes
corresponded to three important environmental quality issues currently impacting on New
Zealand coastal ecosystems, namely sediment loads, nutrient pollution, and declining fish
stocks. Travel distance was included as a proxy for the price of a beach visit. The choice
situation did not ask participants to express a WTP for a hypothetical increase in an environ-
mental good. Rather, it asked them to make choices about which beach to visit on a day trip,
where alternative beaches were described in terms of these three environmental attributes
and a travel distance. From these choices, the relative preferences and WTP for changes in
each environmental attribute could then be inferred, rather like in a random utility site choice
model estimated with revealed preference data on recreation behaviours.
Having viewed one of the three sets of film clips, respondents read the following text:
We now want to ask you some questions about the New Zealand coast. Many of us
enjoy a visit to the beach, whether to go surfing, swimming, or just hanging out.
Many people also enjoy fishing and boat trips. The state of the environment can affect
peoples’ experiences during such visits, and may be one of the factors determining
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which beaches they choose to visit. Most of these environmental conditions – such as
water quality – are partly determined by howwemanage our coastal areas (for example,
how much money is spent on pollution control).
Imagine that you have decided to take a day trip to a beach in this area, and are thinking
about where to go. On the next screens, you’ll see a number of options. We’d like you
to make a choice in each case about which beach you’d prefer to visit. Whilst there are
many factors determining where you might want to go, these options are all concerned
with the environmental conditions at different beaches. Another important factor is
obviously how far you would have to travel, so you will see some information in the
choice sets about this too. You can assume that it is safe to surf or swim at all of these
beaches.
Respondents were then told about the attributes which would describe their choices. The first
attribute used to describe beach visits was Water Quality. Water Quality was described in the
following way:
WATER QUALITY is important so that we can swim safely without getting sick, keep
the animals and plants that live in the sea healthy and to keep the sea looking beautiful.
Water entering the coastal zones is affected by human wastes and can be laden with
nutrients and other contaminants from farmland. If we take no further action, with a
growing population and reduced effectiveness of infrastructure over time, water quality
will get worse. This may cause more beach closures (due to pollution by “coliforms”
or algal blooms) in certain places. However, if we increase our efforts we will be
able to maintain water quality to the current standards we experience (likelihood of
beach closures remains similar to the present) and further efforts could actually see an
improvement in water quality (reduced risks of beach closures, no algal blooms, and
healthier waterways).
In the choices below, you will find that water quality might take one of 3 levels:
• Poor water quality – high levels of nutrients, algal blooms likely
• Good water quality
• Very good water quality – nutrient levels are greatly reduced, algal blooms very
unlikely
The second attribute used was sediments. Many areas of the New Zealand coastline have
suffered from increased sediment loads, which have resulted in a change in water clarity, the
loss of sand areas, and the increased growth of mangroves which greatly impedes access to
the water. Respondents were provided with the following information:
SEDIMENTS affect thewaywe experience the coast, from the clarity of thewater (how
far downyou can see) to underfoot conditions. Changes in land-usesmean that sediment
arriving in our harbours and estuaries has increased. This has caused a muddying of
many shores and high levels of turbidity that result in the water being murky and
unattractive. If we take no further action, sediment will continue to accumulate at the
coast and areas of muddy sediment will increase (in coverage and in muddiness). In
some places, this will result in further expansion of mangroves.While we can’t entirely
remove the sediment problem, it is possible to reduce its impacts. With an increased
effort in storm-water management areas, we may also be able to improve on the current
situation, leading to cleaner, bluer water) and less muddy shores.
In the choices below, you will find that water quality might take one of three levels:
• High levels of sediment – water is very cloudy, beaches become muddy
• Medium levels of sediment
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• Low levels of sediment – water is very clear, beaches stay sandy
The third attribute used to describe visits to the beach was fish populations. Fish populations,
both in terms of their size and diversity, are likely to be important for very popular recreational
activities such as sea angling, scuba diving, and snorkelling. Respondents were provided with
the following information (note that we focus on changes in fish populations, rather than
absolute levels):
FISH POPULATIONSmany people like to go fishing, for example for snapper. Others
like to just know that there are healthy fish stocks in the sea. How good fish stocks
are depend on how the coastal environment is managed. Right now, fish populations
are under pressure from over-fishing and from water pollution. We can take actions to
reduce these pressures, but unless we do so, stocks might continue to decline.
In the choices below, you will find that fish populations might take one of three levels:
• Declining – fish populations are falling due to too much pollution and too much
fishing
• Stable
• Increasing – there are healthy and expandingfish populations of fish such as snapper.
Finally, we included a price or cost attribute to allow welfare measures to be calculated from
the choice responses. People in New Zealand currently pay for some of the costs of water
pollution control through their regional and local taxes, but not everyone pays (e.g., students
do not), whilst the link between recreational beach quality and variations in such taxes is
unclear. Therefore, we did not use regional or local taxes as a bid vehicle, unlike in some
similar studies (e.g., Hanley et al. 2006). Access to beaches in New Zealand is free in the
sense of no entry fee being levied for access, meaning that we could not use an entry fee as
the price attribute. However, individuals do pay to travel to beaches through fuel costs, and
so travel distance was used as a price proxy for each choice option. Several environmental
choice experiment studies have used travel costs as the price attribute (e.g., Hynes et al.
2013; Christie et al. 2007). Values for possible distances were chosen based on a maximum
two-hour, one-way distance from Hamilton, New Zealand to a set of actual beaches with
which respondents might be familiar. The highest value for distance was thus set at 120 km;
the shortest distance was set as 30 km.
Given this set of attributes and levels, three blocks of 8 choice sets were constructed. Each
choice set contains three choice options: visit beach A, visit beach B, or visit neither and
make no beach trip on that choice occasion. Based on random utility theory, we expect each
individual to choose that option in each choice set (A, B, neither) which maximizes utility
from that choice occasion, independently of any emotional manipulation. Each individual
faces 8 choice cards and so provides 8 observations of choices between three alternatives.
We model their choices as a function of the attributes and levels in each choice option, and
the emotional treatment which they received. An example of the choice card is included as
Table 2.
3.3 Lab Procedure
Each session proceeded as follows: (1) upon arrival to the laboratory, participants were free
to choose any computer desk to use for the session. The desks are specifically designed with
privacy walls surrounding to minimize external influences. (2) Once everyone was seated,
a short welcome speech was provided by the experimenter after which the survey program
was run simultaneously for everyone. (3) Participants were initially provided a screen asking
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Table 2 Example Choice Card
Beach A Beach B
Water quality Good Very good Go to neither—I would not want to visit either of
these beaches and would stay at home instead
Sediments Low High
Fish populations Stable Declining
How far from where you live? 120 km 30 km
I would choose:   
their area of academic study and where they are from. Once everyone completed these two
questions, the movie clips started simultaneously for everyone. All subjects were provided
headphones for viewing the movies. (4) Upon completion of the movie, participants took
part in the choice experiment survey. (5) Finally, participants answered a series of questions
regarding their personal traits and a self-assessment of emotional state inducedwhilewatching
the movie. Participants were asked to wait quietly until everyone was finished and then were
called back one at a time to be privately paid their participation fee.
4 Econometric Approach
The theoretical foundations for the analysis of our choice experiment data are provided by
the random utility theory (McFadden 1974). Formally, assume that the utilityU derived from
respondent i’s choice of alternative j in choice task t can be expressed by:
Ui jt = Xi j tβi + ei j t , (1)
where the utility expression is separable in attribute levels X with the vector of associated
parameters β,3 and a stochastic component e allowing for other factors than those observed by
a modeller to affect individual’s choices. The stochastic component of the utility function is
of unknown, with possibly heteroskedastic, individual-specific, variance
(
var
(
ei j t
) = s2i
)
.
Identification of the model is typically assured by normalizing this variance, making the
error term εi j t = ei j t · σi , where σi = π/
(√
6si
)
, identically and independently, extreme
value type 1 distributed with a constant variance var
(
εi j t
) = π2/6. This specification of the
error term leads to convenient expression of choice probabilities—an individual will choose
alternative j if Ui jt > Uikt , for all k = j , and the probability that alternative j is chosen
from a set of J alternatives becomes
P ( j |J ) = exp
(
Xi jt
(
σiβi
))
∑J
k=1 exp
(
Xikt
(
σiβi
)) . (2)
Note that in the above specification, as a result of normalization the preference parameters
become σiβi . Due to the ordinal nature of utility (the preference parameters do not have
a direct interpretation anyway), this specification still represents the same preferences for
individual i . Note also that emotional state does not enter the utility function, and so should
3 Note that the coefficients are indexed by respondents—in the multinomial logit model all respondents
are assumed to have exactly the same preference parameters, while in the mixed logit model respondents’
coefficients can differ and are assumed to follow an a priori specified multivariate parametric distributions.
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not influence choices, unless it changes the preference parameters β or the scale parameter
σ .
We next use this approach to test if the (objective) emotional treatments or the (subjectively
reported) emotional states of the respondents (represented jointly by a vector of covariates
z) lead to significant differences in their observed choices. Following Czajkowski et al.
(2016) and representing the individual-specific random taste parameters by a vector of their
population means b and individual-specific deviations from these means υi 4: βi = b+ziφ+
υi exp (ziψ). The parametersφ represent the effect of emotions on means and the parameters
ψ represent the effect of emotions on standard deviations of random taste parameters βi .
Alternatively, to test if emotions influence stochastic component of utility function
e, i.e. the level of apparent randomness of respondent’s choices. This is operational-
ized by specifying the scale parameter to be a function of emotions-related covariates z:
σi = π/
(√
6si
)
exp (ziξ). The parameters ξ represent the effect of emotions on scale. Note
that scale is inversely related to variance of error term, and therefore positive values of ξ
would lead to smaller variance of e.
Note that in the case of binary (e.g., dummy-coded) z it is not possible to identify a model
in which z are simultaneously used as explanatory variables of means and standard deviations
of random preference parameters and as an explanatory variable of scale.5 This is because
βi and σi always enter the model as a product, and hence imposing particular constraints on
φ and ψ is equivalent of ξ (Hess and Rose 2012).6 For this reason, we separately test if we
find the effect of emotions on means b and standard deviations s of the random preference
parameters (i.e., we test ifφ andψ are significantly different from 0) and then test if emotions
affect the scale parameter σi .7,8
5 Results
In this section we present the results of our empirical investigation into whether emotional
states influence individual’s preferences. We start with the results of ordered probit models
in which respondents’ Likert-scale responses to questions regarding whether while watching
the film clips they felt sad compared to happy and felt bad compared to good (Table 3). The
results show that our treatments significantly influenced the extent to which respondents self-
reported they felt sad or happy (panel A) and bad or good (panel B)—i.e., our experimental
4 For example, for uncorrelated normally distributed βi , υi = sς i where s is a diagonal matrix of standard
deviations and ς i is a vector of random, standard normally distributed unobserved taste variations associated
with preference parameters (with mean vector 0 and covariance (identity) matrix I).
5 In the case of z composed of continuous covariates, it is theoretically possible to simultaneously estimate
φ, ψ and ξ, however, note that identification would only be possible because of allowing for a more flexible
(non-linear) functional form, making interpretation of the estimated parameters unrelated to separate effects
for preference or scale parameters.
6 Observing an effect for the scale parameter is equivalent to observing a simultaneous and equal effect for
all preference parameters (means and standard deviations), or interpreted differently, an effect for the error
term of the utility function which can be thought of as the level of randomness of the choices, as observed by
a researcher.
7 Even if the former specification is significantly better fitted to data, it does not mean that there is no effect
of covariates z on scale. In such a case, a researcher can only conclude that besides the scale effect (which may
or may not exist) there are also other effects influencing random parameters means and standard deviations.
8 Themodels were estimated inMatlab. The software used here (estimation package for DCE data) is available
from github.com/czaj/DCE under CC BY 4.0 license. The dataset, additional results, and estimation codes are
available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3 The effects of emotional treatments on individuals’ self-reported emotional states—the results of
ordered probit models
(A) sad-happy (B) bad-good
Coefficient Coefficient
(SE) (SE)
Index probability function probability parameters
Happy treatment 1.3987∗∗∗ 1.1684∗∗∗
(0.1635) (0.1574)
Sad treatment −2.2936∗∗∗ −1.4130∗∗∗
(0.1660) (0.1585)
Threshold parameters for index function
Constant 2.6731∗∗∗ 2.5598∗∗∗
(0.1210) (0.1153)
η1 0.7441∗∗∗ 0.6529∗∗∗
(0.1000) (0.0984)
η2 1.5492∗∗∗ 1.1778∗∗∗
(0.1108) (0.1000)
η3 3.0243∗∗∗ 2.7623∗∗∗
(0.1042) (0.0936)
η4 3.8369∗∗∗ 3.5245∗∗∗
(0.1014) (0.0928)
η5 4.7355
∗∗∗ 4.3084∗∗∗
(0.1326) (0.1214)
Model characteristics
Log-likelihood (constant only) −541.7879 −498.7284
Log-likelihood −388.1543 −498.7284
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.2836 0.1913
AIC/n 2.7610 2.8660
n (observations) 287 287
k (parameters) 8 8
Individuals were asked to respond to the following statements: While I was watching the film I felt. . .1 = sad,
4 = neither happy nor sad, 7 = happy; 1 = bad, 4 = neither bad nor good, 7 = good
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively
stimuliworked.We then turn to presenting the results of themixed logitmodels accounting for
the influence of emotional states on preferences, which are presented in detail in Tables 6, 7, 8
and 9, and are summarized in Table 4which is used to succinctly compare all of themodelling
approaches reported in this section. Finally, Table 5 presents the results of statistical tests of
our research hypotheses.
To establish a baseline, panel A of Table 6 and the first row of Table 4 presents a general
model which ignores which emotional treatment group participants were in. The variable
names represent improvements in water quality levels—good (WQ1) and very good (WQ2)
vs. the current poor water quality (reference level); sediment levels—medium (SED1) and
low (SED0) vs. the current high levels of sediments (reference level); fish populations – stable
(FISH1) and increasing (FISH2) vs. the current declining levels; the effects of changes in
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Table 4 Summary of the results of modelling the effects of emotional treatments and self-reported emotional
states on individuals’ preference or scale parameters
Model
specification
Log-likelihood k (parameters) McFadden’s
pseudo R2
Ben-Akiva
Lerman’s
pseudo R2
AIC/n
(A) Baseline −1913.91 16 0.2163 0.4477 1.6812
(B) Effect of
emotional treatments
(separate) on
preferences
−1903.61 48 0.2205 0.4494 1.7009
(C) Effect of
emotional treatments
(combined) on
preferences
−1908.92 32 0.2183 0.4485 1.6911
(D) Effect of
emotional treatments
(separate) on scale
−1911.86 18 0.2171 0.4479 1.6812
(E) Effect of emotional
treatments (combined)
on scale
−1913.57 17 0.2164 0.4477 1.6818
(F) Effect of self-
reported emotional
states on preferences
−1902.08 48 0.2211 0.4501 1.6996
(G) Effect of self-
reported emotional
states (absolute
strength) on
preferences
−1906.11 48 0.2195 0.4493 1.7031
(H) Effect of self-
reported emotional
states on scale
−1909.75 18 0.2180 0.4484 1.6794
(I) Effect of self-
reported emotional
states (absolute
strength) on scale
−1913.07 18 0.2166 0.4481 1.6823
travel distance to a beach (DIST) and respondents’ propensity to choose the opt-out (‘go to
neither’) option (OO). The coefficients correspond to utility function parameters and although
do not have direct interpretation, their signs and relative values represent the marginal utility
an individual derives from an alternative with a particular attribute. These marginal utilities
influence the probability he or she will choose a particular alternative. Overall, respondents
prefer beaches with better water quality, less sediments and increasing fish populations. This
may be seen by looking at the sign and significance of the parameter estimates forWQ, SED
and FISH. Distance also plays an important role and, as expected, the longer the drive the
less preferred a beach, other things being equal.
The next model (Table 6), presented as model B, accounts for the emotional treatments of
the experiment. In addition to the main effects of attributes on choices, each attribute’s mean
and standard deviation is interacted with a dummy representing being exposed to the sadness-
or happiness- inducing film clip, relative to the neutral treatment. In model C (Table 7) there
is only one set of interactions for being treated in general (with either happy or sad movies
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Table 5 Likelihood ratio test results of the constraints associated with the effects of emotional treatments
and self-reported emotional states on individuals’ preference or scale parameters
Test performed (models
compared)
Likelihood ratio
test statistic
Degrees of freedom (number of
equality constraints imposed)
P value
B vs. C 6.4874 14 0.9527
B vs. D 19.6852 30 0.9245
B vs. A 23.7932 32 0.8518
C vs. E 9.9033 15 0.8258
C vs. A 10.5954 16 0.8337
D vs. E 3.4159 1 0.0646
D vs. A 4.1080 2 0.1282
E vs. A 0.6921 1 0.4055
F vs. H 15.3507 30 0.9876
F vs. A 23.6707 32 0.8561
G vs. I 13.9239 30 0.9945
G vs. A 15.6048 32 0.9934
compared to the neutral movie clips), and models D and E include interactions with dummies
associated emotional treatments (separate or combined, respectively) as explanatory variables
of scale, rather than mean and standard deviation of each preference parameter.
Our research hypotheses are tested using likelihood ratio (LR) tests, the results of which
are provided in Table 5. H10 (individuals in a sad or a happy (i.e., non-neutral) emotional state
will state different preferences for changes in an environmental good than those in a neutral
emotional state) can be tested by restricting the model B to model D, i.e. constraining all
preference parameters to equal across the neutral, happy and sad treatments, while allowing
for possible scale differences resulting from treatments. This hypothesis is rejected, as the LR
test result shows that such a constraint does not significantly worsen the explanatory power
of the model. There are no statistically significant differences between preference parameters
between the treatments. In fact, the same also holds for the scale differences, as illustrated
by comparing model D with model A, i.e. testing if treatment-related covariates of scale are
significant. This leads to rejecting H30 (individuals in a sad or happy (i.e., non-neutral) state
will display a different randomness of stated choices than individuals in a neutral state).
Similarly, by testing if restricting the model B to model C leads to significant decrease in
the explanatory power, we are able to reject our H20 (individuals who are in a happy emotional
state will state different preferences for changes in an environmental good than those in a
sad emotional state). We find that the preferences of those who were in a happy treatment
are not statistically different from the preferences of those who were in a sad treatment. The
same holds for scale differences – by comparing the model D with the model E we are able
to reject H40 (individuals in a happy emotional state will display a different randomness of
stated choices than individuals in a sad emotional state).
Table 5 also includes the results of other tests that could be of use in examining whether
the emotional treatments influenced preference or scale parameters. In all cases, the restric-
tions cannot be rejected, i.e. we find no emotional treatment-driven statistical differences
in preference or scale parameters. Even though a few interactions with standard deviations
appear significant in model B and C, we do not find consistent evidence that exposing respon-
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dents to emotional treatments consistently influences their stated preferences. Since WTP
for a marginal change in any attribute is given by dividing the coefficient on that attribute
by the coefficient on travel distance as a proxy for price, and emotional treatment makes no
significant change to either the denominator or the numerator, there are thus no significant
effects on WTP.
5.1 Robustness Tests and Alternative Explanations
Our null results may have come about for a number of reasons. In this section we probe the
robustness of our result and examine alternative explanations.
One question which might be raised about the robustness of the hypotheses tests concerns
how long the induced emotional states persisted in our experiment. It has been demonstrated
that participants with severe amnesia, and who thus quickly “forgot” the content of the film
clips, still experienced the experimentally-induced emotions (Feinstein et al. 2010; see also
Andrade and Ariely 2009). Despite such evidence, and despite the emotional treatments
having a statistically significant effect for the self-declared emotional states (Table 3) which
were elicited after all choice tasks were completed, it might still be thought that the effects
of viewing any of the films would be stronger, the closer in time choices are made to the film
viewing. Note that stated preferences might change over a task sequence for many reasons
such as preference learning, task familiarity and the increasing use of heuristics, so that
identifying the time-dependent effects of film viewing on choices across a sequence would
be difficult. Nevertheless, we compared the MXL model preference parameter interactions
with treatment between the first 4 and all eight choices. In none of these cases were treatment
effects significant, so that there does not seem to be a time proximity effect for the emotional
manipulation in this case.
We next wondered whether, despite no effect of the emotional treatments on the prefer-
ences respondents displayed for beach qualities, respondents’ self-reported emotional states
influenced their choices, and hence their stated preferences and scale. To do this, we used
each of the two normalized9 7-point Likert scale responses mentioned above (happy-sad,
bad-good), as explanatory variables of respondents’ preferences. Tables 8 and 9 contain the
results. In model F they were interacted with the mean and the standard deviation of each
preference parameter. In model G, their absolute strength (measured as deviation from the
neutral state) was used. The respective models in which they enter as interactions of scale
are model H and model I. As illustrated by the test results, presented in Table 5, we found
that feeling sad and bad or happy and good did not significantly influence individuals’ stated
preferences for beach qualities or the randomness of their responses. This was irrespective of
whether the self-reports were measured on a negative/positive scale (model F, model H) or
on an absolute arousal scale, which reflected how far away from a neutral state a respondent
was on each scale (model G, model I).
Another concern with the results reported here is whether the sample is large enough to
be able to detect a significant effect of the treatment on preferences. We thus conducted a
simulation which shows that conditional on our sample size and resulting average levels of
the estimates of attribute parameters, as well as the standard errors resulting from the mixed
logit model, we would identify significant treatment effects if they were larger than 14.4% (at
the 0.1 confidence level) or 17.1% (at the 0.05 confidence level) of the mean attribute levels.
In other words, if the treatments made respondents’ preference parameters change by more
than 14 or 17%, respectively, thenwewould be able to observe a statistically significant effect
9 The variables were normalized so that each one’s mean was equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 1.
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in our sample.10 For comparison purposes the mean of the absolute values of the estimated
(insignificant) shifts indicated by model B are 20% of attribute parameters.
We also investigated whether peoples’ experience with the good (beach visits) helps
determine whether emotional treatment has an effect on choices. The only variable which
we can use for controlling respondents’ previous recreation behaviour is the number of trips
to beaches a respondent made in the last 12 months. All our respondents reported that they
made at least one such a trip, with the median equal to 5, mean close to 12, and a maximum
of 250 trips. The use of this variable to control for familiarity with the good did not reveal
any significant effect. That is, those who visit the beach a lot show no more response to a
change in their incidental emotional condition in terms of stated preferences for the attributes
of the good than those who visit the beach less often. The results of the models including
interactions with the number of trips are available as on-line supplementary materials to this
paper, are available from the authors upon request, and at www.czaj.org.
As noted by one of our reviewers, our datamay suffer from a potential problem of excluded
variables. Even though we asked respondents to make choices between hypothetical beaches,
it is possible that they used the distance provided to think about a particular beach which
is located at a specified distance from our lab in Hamilton. If this was the case, other (not
controlled for in the experiment) beach attributes and distance from Hamilton would be
correlated. We acknowledge this possibility and to test if it changes our results we estimated
the same set of models with the dummy coded distance parameters. This way, the dummies
for the distance of 50, 80 or 120 km can also serve as fixed effects controlling for other
characteristics of beaches located within a particular distance from Hamilton. The results
of such an approach were qualitatively the same—objective changes or subjective levels of
emotional states did not seem to significantly influence the preference or scale parameters.
Finally, we note that we found qualitatively similar results when we applied multinomial
logit, scaled multinomial logit and generalized multinomial logit models to the data (Fiebig
et al. 2010). All these modelling approaches consistently showed that emotional states did
not significantly influence the stated preferences of our respondents. In other words, our key
result is very robust.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper,we speculated that variations of incidental emotionswouldhelp explain observed
heterogeneity in stated preferences for environmental goods. This speculation is based on an
extensive literature in behavioural science and psychology which finds that such emotions
do play a role in changing how people behave, and how they value options. If stated choices
are indeed affected by incidental emotions, then this would create problems for benefit-cost
analysis, since it would result in a highly volatile context-dependence for welfare measures
derived from stated preference methods.11
Our experiment included treatments which clearly influenced respondents’ (subjective)
emotional states (Table 3)—sad film clips made respondents feel sadder and worse, whilst
happy clips made respondents say they felt happier and better. This means that respondents
were not indifferent to the filmclips and their emotional stateswere affected—our inducement
10 Although, note that this simulation is rather informal. If the interaction effect is not exactly equal to zero
then increasing the sample would eventually make it appear significant. This is one of the reasons why some
recommend against using p-values for such a purpose (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016).
11 Although we acknowledge that much of the test-retest literature fails to reject the null of stable preferences
over time.
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of emotions was successful. However, we found that there were no significant effects of
incidental emotions on stated choices.We rejected both null hypotheses relating to preference
heterogeneity (H10 , H
2
0 ): inducing people into a more sad or a more happy state than neutral
produced no statistically significant effects on estimated preference parameters and thus on
WTP for changes in beach quality. Moreover, we failed to find any significant effect of
variations in emotional state on the randomness of choice (we rejected hypotheses H30 and
H40 ), despite work in behavioural sciences which has suggested that emotional state can
impact on choice rationality (Bless et al. 1996a, b; Loewenstein et al. 2001).
An important question is thus why the effects of emotional treatment on stated preferences
found here are at oddswith findings in behavioural science related to actual behaviour. Indeed,
in this behavioural science literature, there is very little documented evidence of instances
where individual’s choices were not influenced by incidental emotions (Lerner et al. 2014).
There are several possible explanations. One important concern is that this may in part be the
result of publication biaswhich ismore prevalent in somefields (Yong2012;Krawczyk2015).
However, it could also be that the null results are caused by the hypothetical nature of the
stated preference exercise used here. Many of the studies that have shown that emotions play
an important role in decisions are based on actual behaviour rather than stated preferences.
Since actual behaviour does not always conform to intended behaviour (Carrington et al.
2010) this would suggest that the pathway by which emotion influences behaviour is not
through the intermediate route of behavioural intention (stated preference).
A further explanation is that that individuals in our experiment were making choices over
environmental goods (trips to beaches described in terms of coastal water quality) where the
benefits of improvement are shared by many. One can speculate that choices over such goods
are potentially not as sensitive to incidental emotions as decisions over consuming private
goods. Future work could thus test whether we get the same null result when choices are for
pure private goods, and/or in the case of actual monetary transactions. Further, it is important
to highlight that we only examined the effects of one type of emotions here—incidental
emotions. We did not test whether variations in other kinds of emotions have an effect on
stated preferences, and thus on the stability of welfare measures. We also cannot claim that
the null results obtained here for variations in incidental emotions can be generalized for
other choice situations and other goods. Testing such generalizability would require further
empirical work.
Finally, we note that work by several authors has established that what respondents believe
the consequences of their choices to be in stated preference exercises is important for deter-
mining the demand-revealing nature of stated preference responses (Vossler et al. 2012). In
the experiment reported in this paper, no measures were obtained of perceived consequential-
ity. Our participants were not choosing over potential increases in the supply of public goods
conditional on their statedWillingness To Pay (WTP). Rather, they were choosing alternative
beach trip destinations, where these choice alternatives varied in terms of their environmental
attributes (the public goods of coastal water quality and marine biodiversity), and travel dis-
tance as a proxy for travel cost. It is hard to think how a consequentiality statement could have
been incorporated into our experiment. There is also an interesting possibility that any finding
of significant impact of emotions on WTP could in fact be a combination of two effects. The
first is the effect of emotional state (sad, happy) on preferences towards any of the design
attributes. The second is the possible effect of emotional state on belief in the consequences
of a stated preference study. As one referee pointed out, if sad people are more willing to pay
for an improvement in water quality than happy people, but also have different beliefs on the
policy or payment consequentiality of their responses, then any treatment effect would be a
combination of these two influences. As we have no measure of perceived consequentiality
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for participants, then this cannot be tested in the data used here. However, it is an interesting
avenue for future work.
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See Tables Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9.
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Table 8 The effects of self-reported emotional states on individuals’ preference or scale parameters—the
results of MXL model (F)
Variable (F) Effect of self-reported emotional states on preferences
Main effects Interactions with sad-
happy emotional state
Interactions with bad-
good emotional state
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
WQ1 2.6577
∗∗∗ 0.0047 0.0792 0.0003 −0.2566 0.0046
(0.1355) (0.1994) (0.1924) (0.2443) (0.1953) (0.2314)
WQ2 3.2657
∗∗∗ 0.0023 −0.0796 0.0094 −0.3078 0.0006
(0.1640) (0.1721) (0.2368) (0.1565) (0.2434) (0.1674)
SED1 1.0146∗∗∗ 0.0143 0.2891 0.1473 −0.3647∗∗ 0.0004
(0.1010) (0.2998) (0.1603) (0.3490) (0.1651) (0.1724)
SED0 1.2409∗∗∗ 0.7725∗∗∗ 0.3871 0.2502 −0.5455∗∗ 0.0503
(0.1449) (0.1769) (0.2270) (0.4047) (0.2364) (0.3731)
FISH1 0.7649∗∗∗ 0.1492 0.0125 0.1249 −0.0447 0.0053
(0.0949) (0.4728) (0.1521) (0.4119) (0.1558) (0.3855)
FISH2 0.8855∗∗∗ 0.7444∗∗∗ 0.3043 0.1423 −0.4618 0.5550∗∗
(0.1488) (0.2089) (0.2339) (0.4772) (0.2457) (0.2354)
OO 0.8701∗∗∗ 1.5883∗∗∗ 0.2584 0.2022 −0.2149 0.4213
(0.1789) (0.1999) (0.2884) (0.5388) (0.2939) (0.3986)
DIST −1.9281∗∗∗ 1.2498∗∗∗ −0.3333 0.0512 0.6252∗∗ 0.1578
(0.1779) (0.1678) (0.2717) (0.4343) (0.2831) (0.4932)
Model characteristics
Log-likelihood (constants only) −2442.06
Log-likelihood −1902.08
McFadden’s pseudo R2 0.2211
Ben-Akiva Lerman’s pseudo R2 0.4501
AIC/n 1.6996
n (observations) 2296
k (parameters) 48
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ represent significance at 1, 5, 10% level; standard errors in parentheses
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